Economic Analysis of Eradication and Alternative Crop Policies for Controlling Coca Supply in Colombia by Robledo Caicedo, Jilmar David
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Dissertations and Theses in Agricultural Economics Agricultural Economics Department
7-2015
Economic Analysis of Eradication and Alternative
Crop Policies for Controlling Coca Supply in
Colombia
Jilmar David Robledo Caicedo
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, jrobledo@huskers.unl.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/agecondiss
Part of the Agricultural Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Agricultural Economics Department at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska -
Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and Theses in Agricultural Economics by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Robledo Caicedo, Jilmar David, "Economic Analysis of Eradication and Alternative Crop Policies for Controlling Coca Supply in
Colombia" (2015). Dissertations and Theses in Agricultural Economics. 26.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/agecondiss/26
 Economic Analysis of Eradication and Alternative Crop Policies for Controlling Coca 
Supply in Colombia  
by 
 
Jilmar David Robledo Caicedo 
 
A THESIS 
 
 
Presented to the Faculty of 
The Graduate College at the University of Nebraska 
In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements 
For the Degree of Master of Science 
 
Major: Agricultural Economics 
 
 
Under the Supervision of  
Professor Azzeddine Azzam 
 
 
Lincoln, Nebraska 
July, 2015 
 Economic Analysis of Eradication and Alternative Crop Policies for Controlling Coca 
Supply in Colombia 
Jilmar David Robledo Caicedo, M.S. 
University of Nebraska, 2015 
Advisor: Azzeddine Azzam 
Coca leaf is the primary input in cocaine production.  Colombia is among the 
three largest coca producers and is the world’s main supplier of cocaine.  This thesis 
examines the interplay between the policies for controlling coca supply in Colombia: 
eradication (aerial spraying of coca) and a price support for alternative crops (coffee and 
cocoa) that compete for land allocation with coca.  The study calibrates a multi-market 
partial equilibrium model to simulate different eradication and price support scenarios in 
order to assess farmers’ response to policy changes.   
The results suggest that an alternative crops policy alone holds little promise to 
significantly reduce coca production.  A price support on individual crops has little effect 
on coca cultivation and coca production.  There is a small gain in reducing coca 
cultivation by providing a simultaneous price support to coffee and cocoa.  However, if 
peasant farmers seek to maximize profits, they would be lured to substitute more land 
between coffee and cocoa rather than taking away land from coca production. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
 Coca is the primary input in cocaine production.  Colombia is among the three 
largest coca producers and is the world’s main supplier of cocaine.  The other top 
producers are Peru, and Bolivia (Dion & Russler, 2008; Lee & Clawson, 1993; Rolles, 
Murkin, Powell, Kushlick & Slater, 2010).  Unlike Colombia where coca cultivation is 
primarily tied to cocaine processing (UNODC, 2014), Bolivia and Peru make a 
distinction between use of coca for cocaine production and use of coca in its natural state 
for culturally tied consumption, such as coca leaf chewing, tea, and medicine (Koops, 
2009; UNODC, 2014).  
Colombia is pursuing two policies in its campaign to discourage cocaine 
production.  The first policy is to eradicate coca through manual destruction and aerial 
spray of herbicides over planted fields. The second policy is to provide farmers with 
economic incentives to abandon coca cultivation (Lee & Clawson, 1993; Veillette & 
Navarrete-Frías, 2005; Vargas, 2005).  
Eradication through spraying has been the dominant anti-drug policy in the last 
three decades in Colombia (Vargas, 2005; Reyes, 2014).  Although there has been 
considerable decline in the total area under coca cultivation, little of this reduction has 
been attributed to successful eradication policy alone.  Rather a combination of factors 
including economic risk, violence, and alternative economic activities appear to make 
significant contributions.  According to UNODC coca cultivation survey (2014), the area 
under coca decreased by almost a half: falling from 98,899 hectares (ha) in 2007 to 
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48,189 ha in 2013.  Recently, however, coca cultivation increased in indigenous and 
Afro-Colombian communities, National Parks and protected areas.  Although the trend at 
the national level shows a general reduction of coca cultivation, 31,641 ha of woodland 
were cleared as a direct result of new coca cultivation during the past two years.  A large 
proportion of this area corresponds to primary woodland, largely concentrated in the 
Southern region of the country along the pacific coast and the borderlands with Ecuador.   
Preponderance of evidence suggests that the eradication policy is doing more 
harm than good.  Glyphosate is the active ingredient used in the herbicides sprayed over 
coca plants.  Although some Colombian and American authorities have argued that aerial 
spray of glyphosate is harmless (Vargas, 2005); others argue that indiscriminate spraying 
of glyphosate in woodlands and biodiverse areas can produce long term effects on fauna 
and flora that cannot be predicted in the short run (Sherret, 2005).  Moreover, 
indiscriminate aerial spraying of glyphosate destroys legal agriculture in the proximities 
to coca plantations (Bishop 2003; Ibanez & Martinsson, 2013).  In addition to 
environmental costs, the policy has negative economic, social, political, and human 
consequences (Moreno-Sanchez, Kraybill & Thompson, 2003; Veillette & Navarrete-
Frías, 2005; Vargas, 2004; Dion & Russler, 2008).  
Peasant farmers respond to the risk of eradication in different ways.  Some 
respond by planting coca more extensively (Moreno-Sanchez et al., 2003).  Others either 
reduce or abandon coca production.  These shifts in responses in coca cultivation result in 
higher coca prices, which in turn lure farmers to expand coca cultivation in other 
locations.  Peasants also suffer from displacement as a result of eradication that wipes out 
indiscriminately their subsistence crops (Dion & Russler, 2008).   
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The policy to incentivize farmers to abandon coca cultivation in Colombia has 
been implemented in the last two decades (Lee & Clawson, 1993).  This policy identifies 
legal crops to replace coca labor and income.  This policy also provides physical and 
social infrastructure to improve other legal activities such as agricultural industrialization, 
building roads and bridges, assistance to develop export channels, and new schools (Lee 
& Clawson, 1993).  Although this policy has historically received less support compared 
to eradication, it holds more promise because it gets to the root the coca problem (Vargas, 
2005; Lee & Clawson, 1993).  Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that alternative 
crops to coca production are generally more effective than eradication in reducing coca 
supply in the short run and the long run (Moreno-Sanchez et al. 2003; Ibanez & Carlsson, 
2010; Tabares & Rosales, 2005).  Nevertheless, alternative crops are less competitive in 
terms of land and labor requirements compared to coca.  Coca is relatively more lucrative 
than most alternative crops, requires little care, can grow in poor quality soils, and 
produces several annual harvests (Lupu, 2004; Ibanez & Martinsson, 2013).  Also, coca 
is a secure cash crop because it has a secure market and it exceeds the profitability of 
most alternative crops even under moderate price risks and aerial fumigation.  
 Nevertheless, the literature suggests that the policy of alternative crops can be 
designed towards successful long-term coca supply reduction.  To begin with, coca 
growers are willing to adopt alternative crops in exchange for abandoning coca (Ibanez & 
Martinsson, 2013; Ibanez & Carlsson, 2010) but, given the heterogeneity of growers, 
different growers require different incentives to abandon coca (Ibanez & Martinsson, 
2013).  Coca cultivators prefer working in a legal environment.  Also, an increase in state 
government presence in coca growing regions reduces significantly coca cultivation 
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(Dion & Russler, 2008).  Although some coca peasant farmers have religious, moral, and 
political motivations to oppose coca cultivation, in many cases coca constitutes the only 
secure source of income to sustain a family in the rural area.  In addition, violence and 
insurgent groups’ influence promote an illegal environment providing economic 
incentives for farmers to grow and supply coca leaves to the system (Ibañez et al., 2013; 
UNODC, 2014; Dube & Varga, 2006; Holmes, Gutiérrez & Curtin, 2006).  
Historically, periodic low prices of alternative crops have not produced sufficient 
profits and absorb enough labor in coca growing regions.  Farmers abandoned traditional 
crop cultivation in periods of low prices.  Comparative disadvantage, high transportation 
costs, low market appraisals for alternative agriculture, little government support, and 
insurgent groups’ influence push farmers out of conventional crops into coca cultivation.  
Consequently, alternative crops alone cannot provide farmers with enough incentives to 
abandon coca cultivation.  Evidence has shown that the threat of violence, economic risks, 
and the fall in the prices of legal crops increases economic incentives for farmers to 
switch to high-return illicit crops (Dube & Varga, 2006; Moreno-Sanchez et al., 2003; 
Ibañez et al., 2013).  Completely eliminating coca cultivation is not possible under the 
threat of violence and extreme poverty (Ibañez et al., 2013; Moreno-Sanchez et al., 2003; 
Veillette & Navarrete-Frías, 2005). 
In sum, it seems that the eradication policy has produced little real impact and in 
some cases the opposite impact in the objectives of reducing the area under coca 
cultivation, and with negative environmental consequences.  The alternative crop policy 
has not been significantly more effective than the eradication policy.  Although farmers 
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are willing to switch to alternative crops, many are not able to switch because alternative 
crops are not profitable in many coca growing regions.    
1.2 Objectives and Methodology 
The objective of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of the effectiveness 
of two policies: eradication and alternative crops to reduce the area under coca cultivation.  
I plan to do so by examining the interplay between the eradication policy and a price 
support policy for coffee and cocoa as alternative crops, competing for land allocation 
with coca under alternative scenarios of eradication.  Coffee and cocoa are traditional 
crops broadly grown in Colombia.  These two crops are among the most implemented 
alternative crops in crop substitution programs because of their large national and 
international market.  Competition of these crops with coca for land allocation depends 
on different factors.  The most important factors are crop prices and coca eradication 
levels.  The higher the returns from alternative crops the more likely the area under coca 
cultivation and coca supply will decrease.  Moreover, eradication also induces farmers to 
switch from coca to alternative crops.  Understanding how alternative crops and coca 
cultivation interact under price supports and eradication allows assessment of the costs 
and benefits of the coca supply reduction policy. 
The methodology used in this thesis is: 
• Develop a multi-market partial equilibrium model that determines optimal land 
allocation between coca, coffee, and cocoa under price supports for coffee and 
cocoa. 
• Calibrate the model to the current situation in Colombia using national data on 
national production and land allocation of coca and alternative crops.   
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• Simulate different eradication and price support scenarios. 
1.3 Organization of the Study 
The next chapter provides a general overview of coca cultivation and its causes 
and consequences in Colombia. Chapter 3 reviews the scholarly literature on Colombia’s 
coca leaf supply reduction policies. Chapter 4 presents the multi-market equilibrium 
model.  Chapter 5 calibrates and simulates the model under alternative combinations of 
eradication price support levels and consequent welfare impacts on farmers. Chapter 6 
summarizes the results and draws policy implications.   
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CHAPTER 2:  OVERVIEW OF COCA INDUSTRY AND RELATED POLICIES 
2.1. The Coca Industry  
Coca (Erythroxylum sp.) has been cultivated in the Peruvian, Bolivian, and 
Colombian Andes for more than one thousand years (Pacini & Franquemont, 1985; 
Dillehay, Rossen & Netherly, 1997; Martin, 1970), and it maintains cultural significance 
and use today.  Unlike conventional crops, coca is a powerful symbol of cultural identity 
widely acknowledged in Peru and Bolivia (Pacini & Franquemont, 1985; Koops, 2009; 
Grisaffi, 2010).  In Bolivia, ancestral use of coca leaf is protected by constitutional law as 
a natural and social symbol and cultural patrimony (Ledebur & Youngers, 2013).  In Peru, 
cultural practices like coca chewing date pre-Inca time (Murphy & Boza, 2012).  In 
Colombia, extensive coca cultivation is a recent phenomenon.  Coca cultivation rose as 
an export crop during the crisis in the mid and late 1970s (Pacini & Franquemont, 1985, p. 
89). 
Besides cultural symbolism, coca cultivation also represents an economic 
alternative for many households in rural communities in the Andean countries.  It has 
several advantages compared to other crops.  First, it can grow and adapt in most places 
in tropical South America where other crops have little possibilities to grow.  Second, it 
has little handling problems, which in turn can decrease costs of labor and transportation 
since the weight-to-price ratio is relatively high compared to other crops.  Third, it is 
more lucrative than most other crops because its income cycle is permanent and has a 
secure market (Lee & Clawson, 1993; Lupu, 2004).  In addition, illicit coca buyers are 
willing to buy coca at the farm gate (Lee & Clawson, 1993; Ibañez et al., 2013; UNODC, 
2008).   
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Acknowledging the harmful side of coca, peasant farmers are willing to grow 
alternative crops.  However, there is no real substitute for the coca crop.  Thus, coca 
cultivation would represent a permanent alternative of income diversification for many 
households in the Andean Countries.  Finding an attractive substitute for coca most likely 
requires government intervention, protection and marketing support for alternative crops.  
In the Andean Countries, coca leaf is sold in both licit and illicit markets.  
Peasants harvest, dry, and sell coca leaf primarily to coca middlemen and in many cases 
retain small volumes for domestic traditional consumption (UNODC, 2008).  Coca has 
been employed in licit industries like flavoring beverages (e.g. Coca-Cola) and for global 
pharmaceutical markets (Lee & Clawson, 1993).  Pro-coca leaders have attempted to 
legitimate export of coca leaf as a conventional crop for tea and chewing (Koops, 2009).  
In the past, defenders of the coca legal market have seen coca leaf as an industrial crop, 
and they have proposed the exploitation of coca’s legal market as an alternative to both 
eradication and substitution in controlling the supply for illicit markets.  However, their 
assessment of the legal market’s potential to absorb coca expansion appeared to be 
overoptimistic, even if some industrialized countries had permitted coca imports, (Lee & 
Clawson, 1993, p 19). 
According to the agreements established in the United Nations Single Convention 
on Drugs and Narcotics signed in 1961 by Colombia Peru, and Bolivia, coca cultivation 
for illicit markets such as cocaine manufacturing is banned in all Andean countries.  The 
use of coca is restricted to demonstrated and significant legal practices admissible by the 
Convention.  The document established that “The Parties shall so far as possible enforce 
the uprooting of all coca bushes which grow wild.  They shall destroy the coca bushes if 
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illegally cultivated”, and that “The Parties may permit the use of coca leaves for the 
preparation of a flavoring agent, which shall not contain any alkaloids, and, to the extent 
necessary for such use, may permit the production, import, export, trade in and 
possession of such leaves”.  However the Convention intended to progressively eliminate 
traditional uses in the implicated countries.  The document states the following: “Coca 
leaf chewing must be abolished within twenty-five years from the coming into force of 
this Convention”.  Nevertheless, local governments continued in their struggle to 
legitimize and preserve licit coca cultivation.  According to Ledebur and Youngers 
(2006), traditional coca growing zones in Bolivia have agreed with the government on the 
new anti-drug law to allow regulated cultivation of coca in certain areas to supply 
traditional local markets.   
Despite the numerous efforts to condemn illicit coca trade, the coca industry has 
been dominated by the illicit market (Lee & Clawson, 1993).  Unlike Peru and Bolivia, 
there is no significant legal market for coca leaf in Colombia, where coca cultivation has 
primarily served as a fuel for Colombia`s internal conflict.  According to Angrist and 
Kugler (2008), coca cultivation has fueled Colombian internal conflict while generating 
few economic benefits for local residents (Angrist & Kugler, 2008, p. 192).  Contrary to 
the general view, the coca industry does not seem to improve the standard of living in the 
coca growing regions (Morales, 1986; Kennedy, Reuter & Riley, 1993; Angrist & Kugler, 
2008).  According to Holmes and Gutierrez (2006), coca cultivation has no significant 
effects on the Colombian economy in comparison with its effect on political violence.  
There appears to be an ambiguous relation between anti-drug policies and coca 
prices in determining coca supply.  As UNODC (2008, p. 18) states, “prices for coca and 
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derivatives in the illicit market do not necessarily react like market prices in the licit 
economy.”  Dube and Vargas (2006) also support this view claiming that coca prices 
alone are not a clear determinant of coca cultivation.  Although total coca cultivation has 
decreased significantly in Colombia during the last five years, coca prices have been 
fairly constant in the same period moving from US$ 1.3/kg in 2009 to US$1.1/kg in 2013 
(UNODC, 2014).  Accordingly, other determinants of demand and supply may have a 
significant influence in the coca industry in Colombia.  For instance, the high 
heterogeneity of producers can have a significant effect on decisions to cultivate coca 
(Ibanez & Martinsson, 2013).  Unlike other countries, coca growers in Colombia 
participate in the illicit coca industry and carry out the transformation of the coca leaf to 
different degrees.  According to UNODC estimations, in Colombia 63% of current coca 
producers sell dry coca leaf at the farm gate as is, 35% grow coca and process coca paste, 
and 2% grow coca and transform it into cocaine base.   
The illicit coca industry is driven by the monopsony power of insurgency that 
controls coca growers and prices.  They control production, processing, and export of 
cocaine and impose their own tax on other businesses and agricultural producers as a 
source of finance (Dube & Vargas, 2006, p. 7).  Since the price of coca leaf that is paid to 
peasants represents only small proportion of the final product retail price (Morales, 1986, 
p. 158), cocaine traffickers hold a strong power to lure farmers to supply illicit coca by 
compensating farm-gate prices when effective anti-drug policies take place.  According 
to UNODC estimates, the average price of harvested coca leaf for 2013 in Colombia was 
about 1.1 US$/kg compared to 2,521 US$/kg of final cocaine retail price in the country’s 
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main cities.  They estimate that one metric ton of fresh coca leaf is required to produce on 
average 1.8 kg of cocaine base (81% pure cocaine alkaloid). 
The illicit coca industry is largely interconnected across Colombian, Peruvian, 
and Bolivian borders.  Although coca cultivation can decrease in one of the three 
neighboring countries, cultivation tends to increase in the counterparts’ borders 
sometimes resulting in similar coca levels in the region (Moreno-Sanchez et al., 2003; 
Rolles et al., 2010).  Consequently, effective coca reduction policies in Colombia will 
likely increase cultivation in Bolivia and Peru in the long run.  According to Lee and 
Clawson (1993), during 1989 and 1992, the success of coca reduction policies in Bolivia 
was offset by expansion of coca cultivation in Peru (p. 19).  Prior to early 1990s, 
Colombia imported and transformed into cocaine most of the coca leaf grown in the 
leading producing countries, Bolivia and Peru (UNODC, 2010).  Afterward, however, the 
structure of the illicit coca industry in Colombia changed.  By 1994 Colombia substituted 
most of the coca leaf imports from Bolivia and Peru with expansion of coca cultivation 
within its borders (Angrist & Kugler, 2008).  By the late 1990s, eradication policies in 
Peru and Bolivia had generated a balloon effect that shifted most coca cultivation to 
Colombia, which in turn became the world’s principal source of coca (Bishop, 2003).  
Indeed, while Colombia has almost always been the world’s principal manufacturer and 
exporter of cocaine, extensive coca cultivation is fairly recent within its borders (Angrist 
& Kugler, 2008, p. 193).   
Recent coca production trends reveal an overall decrease of about 39% in the 
Andean region between 2000 and 2012.  This decrease has been significant because Peru 
and Bolivia have not completely offset Colombian supply reduction.  Despite the overall 
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regional reduction in coca cultivation, Bolivia and Peru significantly increased cultivation.  
While cultivation in Colombia decreased by 70% between 2000 and 2012, it increased by 
39% in Peru and 73% in Bolivia during the same period (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Regional coca cultivation (hectares) 1994-2012 
 
Source: UNODC. 
Weak governance, poverty, and unemployment favor the consolidation of the 
illicit coca industry.  Although peasants are not significantly improving their standard of 
living through coca cultivation (Kennedy et al., 1993; Morales, 1986, p. 158; Steiner, 
1998), the coca industry represents the most attractive cash source in most of the coca 
growing regions.  In Colombia, virtually all coca is cultivated in rural areas plagued by 
poverty and largely controlled by armed insurgent groups (Ibañez et al., 2013; UNODC 
2014; Dube & Vargas, 2006; Holmes et al., 2006).  Nevertheless, coca cultivation is more 
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likely to occur in areas with moderate poverty index raging between 50 and 60 (Dion & 
Russler, 2008, p. 418).  This assertion supports the idea that coca industry requires some 
levels of infrastructure and assets to operate.   
It is very unlikely that coca cultivation will be eliminated in all South American 
Andes because of the large acceptability, income provision, historical significance, and 
the quasi-legal protection it embraces in certain countries.  Although continuous efforts to 
defend ancestral use of coca are legitimate, separating illicit and licit markets is not a 
simple task.  Governments have to compete with illicit industries to control and regulate 
coca supply in the efforts to discourage extensive coca cultivation.  This task requires 
continuous monitoring, extensive cooperation, and government intervention.  Perchance, 
governments can effectively affect illicit coca industries by constraining regional coca 
cultivation to certain levels.  Given the miniscule proportion of cocaine alkaloid per coca 
leaf and the cost associated with its illicitness, illicit industry most likely requires 
significant supply levels to bring in profits.  Therefore, traffickers could be willing to 
provide incentives for farmers to grow coca more extensively in exchange for protection 
and higher returns.  In particular, cocaine traffickers could easily increase incentives like 
higher coca price at farm gate since the percentage of coca price compared to that of the 
final product is insignificant.  In terms of long-term anti-drug policies, governments also 
need to take into consideration that coca bushes grow relatively fast.  Consequently, 
preventing rapid expansion of coca cultivation requires continuous supervision, 
institutional support for legal agriculture, and cooperation of coca cultivators to reach 
agreements upon tolerable levels of coca cultivation for traditional non-drug purposes. 
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2.2. Related Policies 
In their efforts to discourage coca cultivation, producing countries have 
implemented a so-called “carrot and stick” policy.  The carrot is to incentivize farmers to 
abandon coca cultivation through economic incentives and investment in rural 
development infrastructure.  The stick is to destroy coca crops through manual 
eradication and aerial spray of herbicides over planted fields (Lee & Clawson, 1993; 
Veillette & Navarrete-Frías, 2005; Vargas, 2005).   
The carrot policy of crop substitution and alternative development was adopted in 
the Andean countries as an alternative policy to discourage coca cultivation.  
Governments undertook the programs supported by international assistance led by the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (Lee & Clawson, 1993; 
United States General Accounting Office (GAO), 2003).  As pointed out by Farrell 
(1998), this policy started in the 1970s as a crop substitution policy, turning into a 
broader alternative economic development approach in the 1990s.  At first glance, crop 
substitution programs provided farmers with materials and technical support to adopt 
alternative crops and substitute income from illegal coca.  However, the policy turned 
into a broader approach that embraced the development of social and physical 
infrastructure a long with agricultural support (Lee & Clawson, 1993; Tabares & Rosales, 
2005).   
 Lee and Clawson (1993) identify five important elements of the alternative 
development approach.  The first element is related to identifying and promoting crops 
that can provide reasonable income in replacement of coca.  The second one involves 
strengthening the markets for these alternative crops.  The third one involves 
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industrialization and increase of value added processes.  The fourth one includes 
developing social infrastructure such as schools, roads, clinics, and potable water.  The 
fifth one encompasses promoting organizational development including cooperatives and 
other producers’ association.  However, the alternative development approach has failed 
occasionally in the pursuit of discouraging illicit coca cultivation.  Sometimes the 
projects are not well planned or implemented.  As pointed out by Lupu (2004), this 
approach has improved infrastructure in the past that indirectly benefited drug traffickers, 
also has implemented non-traditional alternative crops with little international market or 
deficient domestic capacity of absorption.  Nonetheless, the continuity of this policy is 
often justified on the grounds that it is less punitive and far more politically acceptable 
than eradication in the coca producing countries (Farrell, 1998, p. 396).  
 The stick policy has been designed to kill or lessen yields of cultivated coca fields.  
The eradication policy embraces two components, aerial spray of Glyphosate over 
planted fields and manual destruction of plants (UNODC, 2008).  The two components 
may be implemented independently or together depending on the conditions that take 
place in particular areas.  Conditions involve insurgent retaliation, financial costs, 
geographic access, community cooperation, and others.  
Forced eradication has been institutionally promoted and supported by the United 
States authorities.  This policy, however, besides its widely acknowledged futility 
represents a sensitive political issue (Andreas & Youngers, 1989; Ledebur & Youngers, 
2006; Dion & Russler, 2008; Sherret, 2005; Ceballos, 2003).  Forced eradication has 
historically been the predominant anti-drug policy although it largely ignores the causes 
of coca cultivation due to its punitive nature.  According to Andreas and Youngers (1989), 
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eradication policies in Bolivia received the most attention from the United States before 
1989 spending about half of the anti-drug budget in eradication and only 3.6 % in crop 
substitution.  In accordance, Reyes (2014) asserts that forced eradication in Colombia has 
received the great majority of funding and systematic evaluation compared to alternative 
methods of reducing coca production.  Between 2000 and 2003, the United States 
provided more than $2.5 billion in assistance to the Colombian war on drug programs, 
which in turn was largely dedicated to militarization equipment and roughly 15% in 
alternative development programs (GAO, 2003). 
It has been widely acknowledged that forced eradication far from directly 
affecting cocaine traffickers, predominantly targets the impoverished and most vulnerable 
segment of the population involved in the illicit coca trade (Andreas & Youngers, 1989; 
Reyes, 2014).  Preponderance of evidence suggests that the eradication policy alone does 
not contribute to solving the coca cultivation problem.  Instead, what is needed is larger 
investment in more promising approaches such as alternative development that inherently 
encompasses voluntary and negotiated eradication with peasants (Reyes, 2014; Moreno-
Sanchez et al., 2003; Holmes et al., 2006, Dion & Russler, 2008).   
 The general tendencies in coca cultivation appear to indicate that aerial spray and 
coca cultivation hold a positive correlation.  The trends suggest that when aerial spray is 
intensified coca cultivation increases rapidly.  Likewise, when aerial spray is reduced less 
coca is cultivated (Figure 2).  Although these trends show an incomplete picture of the 
complex relation between the two factors, they support the findings by Moreno-Sanchez 
et al. (2003) and Reyes (2014). 
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Figure 2. Aerial spray and coca cultivation in Colombia (hectares) 
 
Data Source: UNODC. 
In sum, the coca industry in South America requires making a clear distinction 
between cultivation for licit and illicit markets to design more effective anti-drug policies.  
These policies, however, will more likely require a deeper cooperative approach than a 
punitive one between producers and governments.  Although neither policy has proven to 
a better solution per se, the relevance of each policy will depend on the purpose of coca 
cultivation.  Cooperation holds more promise than punishment in generating long-term 
solutions.  Building trust and economic development represent a key factor in war against 
drug trade. 
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
There has been a dearth of empirical research on coca cultivation and supply 
control policies.  The available body of empirical research on coca cultivation has 
primarily addressed the effectiveness of the supply control policies.  Most of the available 
empirical studies focus on the econometric analysis of eradication and alternative 
development.  Little research is available on the behavioral responses of famers to the 
application of supply control policies.   
Riley (1993) presents a dynamic general equilibrium that assesses the impact of 
voluntary and forced eradication, development assistance, and interdiction on the 
production and export of cocaine from Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.  His findings suggest 
that the policies of the source control programs are by themselves incapable of solving 
the national cocaine problem.  According to his results, cocaine production defies 
regulation in the long run.  In the short run, however, source country control programs 
can prove disruptive.  He further suggests that such disruptions in conjunction with other 
elements of the national drug policy including treatment and prevention may be 
combined to yield progress toward national drug objectives.  Kennedy, Reuter, and Riley 
(1993), build a simple general equilibrium model of the cocaine industry in Peru, Bolivia, 
and Colombia.  Their model concludes that crop substitution programs to disrupt coca 
cultivation will have a negligible impact on the world cocaine market. 
Most of the econometric studies on coca cultivation and supply control find little 
efficacy of eradication as an effective policy for controlling coca cultivation.  Using 
United Nations data on annual coca cultivation in Colombia, Moreno-Sanchez et al. 
(2003) estimate an econometric model of Colombian coca cultivation for the period 
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1988-2001.  They include farm-gate coca price, farm-gate price of plantain as alternative 
crop, coca eradication level, and area of coca cultivation in Bolivia and Peru to explain 
coca cultivation in Colombia.  Their findings suggest that the coca eradication policy in 
Colombia does not reduce coca cultivation.  On the contrary, they find that eradication 
increases total coca cultivated area after farmers compensate for the risk of eradication by 
planting more extensively.  Also, they find that the price of plantain and the level of coca 
cultivation in neighboring countries are negatively correlated with coca cultivation in 
Colombia.  Dion and Russler (2008), use a time series cross-sectional dataset of 32 sub-
national departments to explain the determinants of coca cultivation in Colombia 
including aerial fumigation and traditional agriculture during the period 2001 and 2005.  
Their results suggest that eradication as the primary policy during the analyzed period 
had a small and marginal impact on coca cultivation.  They find that the effects of aerial 
fumigation on total coca cultivation are not a direct result of fumigation on coca fields 
but rather a combination of side effects of fumigation; namely: violence, displacement 
and indiscriminate disruption of agriculture in coca growing regions. 
Ibanez and Carlsson (2010), conduct a survey-based choice experiment on coca 
cultivation in Colombia.  They use household level data from a hypothetical choice 
experiment to assess the effectiveness of eradication and alternative development on coca 
cultivation reduction.  They account for monetary and non-monetary factors such as 
profitability of alternative crops, moral cost of cultivating coca, and compliance with the 
law, on farmers’ land allocation decision.  They find that increasing the risk of 
eradication and the relative profitability of alternative crops reduces the proportion of 
farmers and the area involved in coca cultivation. They conclude that a 1% increase in the 
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risk of eradication decrease the area cultivated with coca in 0.66%, while 1% increase in 
relative profitability of alternative crops decrease the area cultivated with coca by 0.47%.   
Ibanez and Matinsson (2013) assess farmers’ behavioral responses implementing 
field experiments to mimic coca cultivation decisions Colombia.  They evaluate the 
efficiency of carrot and stick policies to reduce coca cultivation when producers are 
heterogeneous in terms of risk and moral cost of cultivating coca and estimate their 
respective willingness to accept monetary compensation to stop coca cultivation.  They 
find a considerable number of farmers with a high moral cost cultivating coca.  
According to their findings, about one third of participants in the experiment have a high 
moral cost and would require no compensation to stop cultivating coca.  However, two 
fifths of the participants would require that the relative return of the legal activity were 
1.8 times that of coca, or that the risk of eradication were above 60% to stop cultivating 
coca. 
An econometric study by Reyes (2014) estimated the causal effect of coca forced 
eradication in Colombia.  He analyzes a 6-year panel of municipality coca cultivation and 
eradication data.  He uses an instrumental variable approach to account for the 
eradication endogeneity.  He uses as an instruments the variation in expected coca 
eradication level relative to the distance that spraying aircrafts have to travel outside 
safety zones determined as 80 miles perimeter around their operation airports.  Similar to 
most previous studies, his findings suggest that eradication increases coca cultivation.  
According to his results, a 1% increase in eradication increases the area cultivated with 
coca by 1%.  
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Based on the existing research, there seems to be little support to assert that the 
eradication policy alone can completely discourage coca cultivation.  In this study, we 
contribute to the body of literature by developing a policy model that takes into account 
the intuition provided by the literature about the interplay of eradication and alternative 
crops to shift coca cultivation. 
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CHAPTER 4: ECONOMIC MODEL 
4.1 Model Formulation 
To examine the interplay between the eradication policy (aerial spray) and price 
support policy for coffee and cocoa as alternative crops competing for land allocation, I 
consider a three-commodity model with two legal commodities (coffee, cocoa) and one 
illicit commodity (coca).  Each commodity uses land as the major factor to produce 
output that is sold in the national and international markets.  Coffee and cocoa are widely 
cultivated across the country and they have a large international market that can absorb 
any increase in supply due to the domestic price support policy. 
The respective production functions for the three crops are:  
        (1) 
 
  
  
   (2) 
           (3) 
where qj, lj, αj, for j = 1, 2, and 3, denote the output, the land input, and the elasticity of 
production for coffee, cocoa, and coca crops, respectively.  The constants A1, A2, and A3 
capture all the other factors that shift the coca, cocoa, and coffee production functions. 
The shifter η is a variable that measures the degree of effectiveness of spraying in 
shifting coca output. Specifically, 
    with   0   0 (3a) 
where    is the ratio of total area sprayed to the area that remains cultivated with 
coca.  Hence, as lε increases from zero (no eradication) relative to l3, η increases from one 
(no effect of output) towards zero (total eradication of output).  The parameter ρ captures 
farmers’ production response to eradication.  Lower values of ρ diminish the 
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effectiveness of spraying as farmers internalize the eradication factor by cultivating coca 
more extensively or by intercropping (planting different crops in a field) to minimize the 
damage of aerial spray (Moreno-Sanchez et al., 2003).  Planting more extensively, 
however, does not necessarily translate into higher yields per hectare.  Thus, it is assumed 
that while the area cultivated with coca will remain relatively steady after aerial spray, 
the overall coca production will decrease because of extensive cultivation, replanting or 
intercropping. 
The equations for the three crops supply of land are: 
       !" (4) 
 
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where lj represent the total land cultivated for each crop; Sj is a supply shifter; wj is the 
value of land; and βj is the price elasticity of land supply for the jth crop.  
  Assuming that farmers maximize profits from the three crops, subject to a fixed 
total land area, i.e., 
MAX π   $ % $


 % $
&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Subject to LT=l1+l2+l3 
where $) is the output price for jth crop, and *+ is total area, z represents the Lagrangian 
multiplier, and F is fixed cost.  The profit-maximizing land areas planted for each crop 
can be determined from the following first-order conditions:  
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These conditions imply that farmers will use land for each crop up to the point 
where the marginal value product of land in each crop is equal to the price of land 
devoted to that crop.  These conditions also imply that the demand curve for the land 
factor is negatively sloped.  Therefore, all else equal, more land is used for production as 
its price declines.  Also, farmers will adjust output and land input seeking to maximize 
their profit when the equilibrium circumstances change.  Because it is assumed that land 
can be freely substituted between each crop, the opportunity cost of land and profits 
determine the amount of land that is allocated to each crop and the output that is 
produced assuming that other factors of production remain constant.  Introducing an 
output price change for one crop will cause substitution of land between these activities 
to adjust the change in profits.  Similarly, shifting the output restriction caused by the 
eradication factor will shift the coca demand for land because of change in profit from 
this activity.   
The eradication factor in coca production shifts the input factor demand curve as 
described in Figure 3.  At a certain input price, the total area of land demanded for coca 
changes in relation to the level of eradication that affects output.  Assuming that 
eradication can significantly affect coca output, the shift in demand for the land factor 
will depend on how output price changes with respect to quantity of coca supplied given 
output demand. 
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Figure 3. Input factor demand shift due to eradication in coca 
                           
Output demand of each crop is assumed to be in constant elasticity form:  
  0  $1           (10) 

  0
  $
1          (11) 
  0  $1         (12) 
where )  represents the total demand for each crop, Dj is a scalar that represents all other 
factors that shift final demand; pj represents the domestic price for each crop; γj 
represents the price elasticity of demand, all assumed to be negative. 
Given values for the constants Aj, Sj, Dj, for j=1,2,3; αj, βj, γj, for j=1,2,3; and the 
area subjected to eradication, lε, the system of equations 1-12 can be solved for the 
equilibrium values of the 13 endogenous variables pj, wj, qj, lj and z, for j=1,2,3.  The 
effect of price supports for coffee and cocoa on the supply of coca under alternative 
eradication levels can be simulated by treating p1, p2, as parameters and assuming 
different levels of sprayed area lε. 
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4.2 Model Calibration 
Model calibration is performed in two steps.  The first step generates the values 
for the constants Aj (equations 1-3), Sj (equations 4-6), Dj (equations 10-12) for j=1,2,3 
by using exogenous estimates of elasticities, αj, βj, γj, for j=1,2,3, and observed prices and 
quantities in 2013.  The observed quantity and price data are presented in Table 1. 
I use the elasticities available in the literature for the price elasticities of demand 
for coffee and cocoa.  The price elasticity of demand for coffee ranges from -0.2 to -0.4 
(Feuerstain, 2002; Bettendorf & Verboven, 2000; Durevall, 2005; Mehta & Chavas, 
2008).  The price elasticity of demand for cocoa is reported approximately -0.3 (Gilbert, 
2012).  Therefore this study uses -0.3 for price elasticity of demand for coffee and cocoa.  
The rest of the elasticities are assumed to be similar to those of neighboring countries, 
assigned arbitrary but reasonable values, or simulated over a range of values.  The 
elasticity of production with respect to land is taken to be similar to that of Brazil.  Avila 
and Evenson, (1995) report land and structures production elasticity for Brazil of 0.22.  
Also, the USDA Economic Research Service reports land production elasticity for Brazil 
of 0.2.1 I use 0.2 as the elasticity of production with respect to land for Colombia.  The 
land supply elasticity is assumed to be 0.5, a reasonable assumption for a scarce factor 
like land. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Trindade and Fulginiti (2015) calculate 0.1 as the average land productivity factor for South America. 
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 Table 1. National data and sources (2013)  
 
Using the above elasticities and data in Table 1, model calibration is conducted under 
three different assumptions about elasticity values. : 
•  Assumption 1: αj=0.2, βj=0.5, γj=-0.3 for j=1,2,3 
All land production elasticities are assumed to be 0.2, land supply elasticities to 
be 0.5, and the output demand elasticities to be -0.3. 
• Assumption 2: αj=0.2, β1=0.5, β2=0.5, β3=0.1, γ1=-0.3, γ2=-0.3, γ3=-0.1  
Because coca cultivation is illicit, land supply elasticity for this activity is likely to be 
more inelastic than other crops.  Also, because prices and demand for coca leaf are 
controlled entirely by the Colombian armed insurgents and drug cartels, the price 
elasticity of demand for coca is difficult to approximate.  It is assumed that the elasticity 
Parameter Source Amount 
Domestic Area of Coca UNODC, 2014 48189 (Hectares) 
Aerial Spray (Coca Eradication) UNODC, 2014 47053 (Hectares) 
Domestic Area of Coffee AGRONET 771731 (Hectares) 
Domestic Area of Cocoa AGRONET 151930 (Hectares) 
Domestic Price of Coca UNODC, 2014 1100 ($/Ton) 
Domestic Price of Coffee International Coffee Organization 2500 ($/Ton) 
Domestic Price of Cocoa FEDECACAO 2100 ($/Ton) 
Domestic Output of Coca UNODC, 2014 229497 (Tons) 
Domestic Output of Coffee AGRONET 653160 (Tons) 
Domestic Output of Cocoa AGRONET 79686 (Tons) 
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of demand for coca is very inelastic because of its illicit nature.  This scenario assumes a 
price elasticity of demand for coca that is more inelastic than that of coffee and cocoa.  
• Assumption 3: αj=0.2, β1=0.5, β2=0.5, β3=0.1, γ1=-0.3, γ2=-0.3, γ3=-0.5 
This assumption is the same as assumption 2 except that the demand for coca is 
assumed to be more elastic than the demand for coffee and cacao. 
The parameter ρ in equation 3a is simulated over a range of values.  The 
parameter summarizes farmers’ response to eradication.  A low (high) value for ρ is 
interpreted as low (high) effectiveness of the eradication policy because of farmers 
respond to eradication by expanding (reducing) the land area devoted to coca cultivation, 
intercropping, replanting, etc.  Alternative values for ρ result in alternative levels of η, 
which, as shown in equation 3a, shifts the production function for coca.  The assumed 
values for ρ and the resulting estimates for η using equation 3a are shown numerically in 
Table 2 and graphically in Figure 4. 
Table 2. Values of η under alternative assumptions of ρ and r (2013) 
ρ l3 le r η 
0.2 48189 47053 0.976 0.82260 
0.4 48189 47053 0.976 0.67667 
0.7 48189 47053 0.976 0.50485 
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Figure 4. Behavior of η under alternative assumptions of ρ and r 
 
When, for example, the ratio of area affected by eradication (48189) to land that 
remains on cultivation (47053) is 0.97, the production shifts by 0.82, 0.68, or 0.50 as ρ 
decreases from 0.2 to 0.7.  In other words, as ρ gets larger, eradication becomes less 
effective.  Similarly, as the ratio r (example from r=1 to r=2) becomes larger the shift in 
coca production function becomes smaller.  For different regions with different ρ, the 
same ratio of eradication r can have a different effect on coca output depending on the 
farmers’ response.  Since each value of ρ calibrates a different value for production 
shifter A3, eliminating eradication will shift coca production differently. 
The calibrated values for Aj, (equations 1-3) Sj (equations 4-6), Dj (equations 10-
12) for j=1,2,3, and associated equilibrium prices and quantities for the three assumptions 
are given in Tables 3, 4, and 5.  The equilibrium prices and quantities will be used as 
benchmarks for comparing the equilibrium prices and quantities induced by the policy 
scenarios considered in the next section.  
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Table 3. Calibrated constants and equilibrium quantities and prices: Assumption 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variables 
Coefficients 
ρ=0.2 ρ=0.4 ρ=0.7 
A1   43403.66   43403.66 43403.66 
A2 7329.15    7329.15 7329.15 
A3 32284.85   39247.32 52604.99 
D1 6829699.30 6829699.30 6829699.30 
D2 790765.69 790765.69 790765.69 
D3 1875835.79 1875835.79 1875835.79 
S1 37514.93 37514.93 37514.93 
S2 10236.46 10236.46 10236.46 
S3 1058.97 866.366 708.328 
η 0.82260 0.67667 0.50485 
l1 771731.1 771731.1 771731.8 
l2 151930 151930 151930.3 
l3 48189.1 48189 48188.9 
w1 423.2 423.2 423.2 
w2 220.3 220.3 220.3 
w3 2070.8 3093.8 4628.3 
q1 653160 653160 653160.1 
q2 79686.1 79686.1 79686.1 
q3 229497.1 229496.8 229497.9 
p1 2500 2500 2500.0 
p2 2100 2100 2100.0 
p3 1100.0 1100 1100 
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Table 4. Calibrated constants and equilibrium quantities and prices: Assumption 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variables 
Coefficients 
ρ=0.2 ρ=0.4 ρ=0.7 
A1   43403.66   43403.66 43403.66 
A2 7329.15    7329.15 7329.15 
A3 32284.85   39247.32 52604.99 
D1 6829699.30 6829699.30 6829699.30 
D2 790765.69 790765.69 790765.69 
D3 462291.90 462291.90 462291.90 
S1 37514.93 37514.93 37514.93 
S2 10236.46 10236.46 10236.46 
S3 22456.12 21572.40 20720.74 
η 0.82260 0.67667 0.50485 
l1 771731.8 771731.7 771731.9 
l2 151930.2 151930.2 151930.3 
l3 48189 48189 48188.9 
w1 423.2 423.2 423.2 
w2 220.3 220.3 220.3 
w3 2070.8 3093.8 4628.2 
q1 653160.1 653160.1 653160.1 
q2 79686.1 79686.1 79686.1 
q3 229497 229496.8 229497.9 
p1 2500 2500 2500 
p2 2100 2100 2100 
p3 1100 1100 1100 
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Table 5. Calibrated constants and equilibrium quantities and prices: Assumption 3 
 
  Variables 
Coefficients 
ρ=0.2 ρ=0.4 ρ=0.7 
A1 43403.66 43403.66 43403.66 
A2 7329.15 7329.15 7329.15 
A3 32284.85 39247.32 52604.99 
D1 6829699.30 6829699.30 6829699.30 
D2 790765.69 790765.69 790765.69 
D3 7611554.40 7611554.40 7611554.40 
S1 37514.93 37514.93 37514.93 
S2 10236.46 10236.46 10236.46 
S3 22456.12 21572.40 20720.74 
η 0.82260 0.67667 0.50485 
l1 771731.8 771731.8 771731.8 
l2 151930.2 151930.2 151930.2 
l3 48189 48189 48189 
w1 423.2 423.2 423.2 
w2 220.3 220.3 220.3 
w3 2070.8 3093.8 4628.3 
q1 653160.1 653160.1 653160.1 
q2 79686.1 79686.1 79686.1 
q3 229497 229496.7 229498.0 
p1 2500 2500 2500 
p2 2100 2100 2100 
p3 1100 1100 1100 
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4.3 Model Simulations  
In this section I simulate 4 policy scenarios:  
1) No eradication (η=1) 
For this scenario, I set the level of eradication lε=0. The no eradication scenario 
shifts the production function of coca upward by different degrees depending on the 
effectiveness of eradication determined by the hypothesized values of ρ and the assumed 
elasticities. 
2) A price support for coffee equivalent to a 10% increase from the 
benchmark equilibrium price of coffee with and without eradication 
For this scenario I increase the price of coffee by 10%.  I also increase the 
benchmark equilibrium price of coffee by 10% and simultaneously eliminate eradication 
exogenously (lε=0).  This shock generates different outcomes for coca production that are 
determined by the hypothesized values of ρ and the assumed elasticities. 
3) A price support for cocoa equivalent to a 10% increase in the benchmark 
equilibrium price of cocoa with and without eradication 
For this scenario I increase the price of cocoa by 10%.  I also increase the 
benchmark equilibrium price of cocoa by 10% and simultaneously eliminate eradication 
exogenously (lε=0).  This scenario generates different outcomes for coca production that 
are determined by the hypothesized values of ρ and the assumed elasticities. 
4) Scenarios 2 and 3 combined 
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4.3.1 Simulation Results and Discussion 
• Scenario one:  No eradication (lε=0, η=1) 
 Using the hypothesized values of ρ and elasticity assumptions 1, 2, and 3, Tables 6, 7, 
and 8 display the respective equilibrium prices and quantities with no eradication 
followed by percent changes in the price and quantities relative to their benchmark values.
Table 6. No eradication: Assumption 1 
 
 
Equilibrium Variables 
αj=0.2, βj=0.5, γj=-0.3 for j=1,2,3, η=1 
ρ=0.2 ρ=0.4 ρ=0.7 
Value ∆% Value ∆% Value ∆% 
l1 781377.6 1.2 786844.3 2.0 792087.2 2.6 
l2 155587.2 2.4 157666.7 3.8 159664.7 5.1 
l3 34885.4 -27.6 27339.1 -43.3 20099.2 -58.3 
w1 433.8 2.5 439.9 3.9 445.8 5.3 
w2 231 4.9 237.2 7.7 243.3 10.4 
w3 1085.2 -47.6 995.8 -67.8 805.2 -82.6 
q1 654784.7 0.2 655698.4 0.4 656569.9 0.5 
q2 80066 0.5 80278.9 0.7 80481.4 1.0 
q3 261533.6 14.0 302807.6 31.9 381647.6 66.3 
p1 2479.4 -0.8 2467.9 -1.3 2457 -1.7 
p2 2067 -1.6 2048.7 -2.4 2031.6 -3.3 
p3 711.6 -35.3 436.6 -60.3 201.9 -81.6 
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Table 7. No eradication: Assumption 2 
 
Table 8. No eradication: Assumption 3 
 
  
Equilibrium Variables 
αj=0.2, β1=0.5, β2=0.5, β3=0.1, γ1=-0.3, γ2=-0.3, γ3=-0.1, η=1 
ρ=0.2 ρ=0.4 ρ=0.7 
Value ∆% Value ∆% Value ∆% 
l1 777712.6 0.8 781868.4 1.3 785266.1 1.8 
l2 154195.7 1.5 155773.7 2.5 157065.9 3.4 
l3 39942.6 -17.1 34208.9 -29.0 29519 -38.7 
w1 429.8 1.6 434.4 2.6 438.2 3.5 
w2 226.9 3.0 231.6 5.1 235.4 6.9 
w3 317 -84.7 100.6 -96.7 34.4 -99.3 
q1 654169.3 0.2 654867 0.3 655435.1 0.3 
q2 79922.3 0.3 80085.2 0.5 80217.7 0.7 
q3 268711.4 17.1 316692.5 38.0 412142.4 79.6 
p1 2487.2 -0.5 2478.3 -0.9 2471.2 -1.2 
p2 2079.4 -1.0 2065.3 -1.7 2054 -2.2 
p3 227.1 -79.4 43.9 -96.0 3.2 -99.7 
Equilibrium Variables 
αj=0.2, β1=0.5, β2=0.5, β3=0.1, γ1=-0.3, γ2=-0.3, γ3=-0.5, η=1 
ρ=0.2 ρ=0.4 ρ=0.7 
Value ∆% Value ∆% Value ∆% 
l1 774348.4 0.3 776013.6 0.6 777840.9 0.8 
l2 152920.5 0.7 153551.5 1.1 154244.4 1.5 
l3 44582.1 -7.5 42285.9 -12.2 39765.7 -17.5 
w1 426.1 0.7 427.9 1.1 429.9 1.6 
w2 223.2 1.3 225 2.1 227 3.0 
w3 951.2 -54.1 837.5 -72.9 677.7 -85.4 
q1 653602.4 0.1 653883.3 0.1 654190.9 0.2 
q2 79789.7 0.1 79855.4 0.2 79927.4 0.3 
q3 274682.5 19.7 330406.9 44.0 437450.2 90.6 
p1 2494.4 -0.2 2490.8 -0.4 2486.9 -0.5 
p2 2090.9 -0.4 2085.2 -0.7 2078.9 -1.0 
p3 767.9 -30.2 530.7 -51.8 302.8 -72.5 
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Under the no-eradication policy, Tables 6, 7, and 8 show that when ρ=0.2, the 
area cultivated with coca decreases from 7.5% to 27% and output increases from 14% to 
19.7%.  When ρ=0.4, the area cultivated with coca decreases from 12.2% to 43.3% and 
output increases 31.9% to 44%.  When ρ=0.7, the area cultivated with coca decreases 
from 17.5% to 58.3% and output increases from 66.3% to 90.6%.  The magnitudes of the 
ranges are driven by the assumed elasticities.  Results in Table 6 assume the values of 
each triplet of elasticities are the same.  Results in Table 7 assume the same elasticities as 
in Table 6, except that the price elasticities of supply and demand for coca are more 
inelastic elasticities for coffee and cocoa.  Results in Table 9 assume the values as Table 
8, except the price elasticity of demand for coca is less inelastic that the corresponding 
elasticities for coffee and cocoa. 
In all three cases, output increases even though the area cultivated with coca 
declines indicating higher yields per hectare and farmers intensifying coca cultivation per 
the area.  Both the respective areas and outputs for coffee and cocoa increase, but the 
increase is very small in magnitude relative to the changes in coca.  Using the 
assumptions of Table 6, coca cultivation decreases by a larger amount and coca output 
increases by a smaller amount than when using the assumptions of Tablets 7 and 8.  Also, 
the magnitude of the percentage change is larger for coca output and smaller for coca 
cultivation when assuming the elasticities of Table 8 than when using the assumptions of 
Table 7. 
The results imply that due to the illicit nature of coca cultivation, peasant farmers 
compensate for the punishment of aerial spray by intercropping, planting expansively, 
replanting, and implementing other strategies that minimize the damage of aerial spray of 
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herbicide over coca plantations.  This response suggests that coca eradication affects 
agricultural productivity because it affects legal crops and farmers’ initial land allocation.  
In the absence of eradication, there would be a small increase in production and area 
cultivated for alternative crops relative to equilibrium. 
In the absence of accurate elasticities and ρ values, I assumed different values that 
cause a large variability in the results.  However, the large drop in coca price p3 when ρ is 
greater than 0.2 may suggest that ρ is more likely to be small.  Historically, coca prices 
have not changed dramatically when eradication changes significantly relative to area 
cultivated (Figure 2). 
• Scenario two: A 10% increase in the price of coffee 
The partial effects of an exogenous 10% increase in the benchmark equilibrium 
price of coffee with and without eradication of coca (lε=0) are summarized in Tables 9, 
10, and 11 using assumptions 1, 2, and 3 about the elasticities. 
Under a price support policy for coffee, with eradication, the results show that 
when ρ=0.2 and ρ=0.4, coca output and area under coca cultivation decreases by less 
than 1%.  With no eradication, the results show that when ρ=0.4 the area cultivated with 
coca decreases from 7.8% to 27.3% and output increases from 13.7% to 19.6%.  When 
ρ=0.4, the area cultivated with coca decreases from 12.6% to 40.6% and output increases 
29.2% to 43.9%.  When ρ=0.7, the area cultivated with coca decreases from 17.9% to 
58.8% and output increases from 65.9% to 90.4%.
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Table 9. Effect of a 10% price support for coffee:  Assumption 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
Including Aerial Spray Eliminating Aerial Spray 
αj=0.2, βj=0.5, γj=-0.3 for j=1,2,3 αj=0.2, βj=0.5, γj=-0.3 for j=1,2,3, η=1 
ρ=0.2 
η=0.82 
∆% 
ρ=0.4 
η=0.68 
∆% 
ρ=0.7 
η=0.50 
∆% ρ=0.2 ∆% ρ=0.4 ∆% ρ=0.7 ∆% 
L1 778227.7 0.8 778176.5 0.8 778145.1 0.8 788380.8 2.2 794203.2 2.9 799696 3.6 
L2 145621.3 -4.2 145605.6 -4.2 145595.9 -4.2 148767 -2.1 150590.6 -0.9 152323.3 0.3 
L3 48001.2 -0.4 48068 -0.3 48110 -0.2 33918.3 -27.3 27056.3 -40.6 19831.7 -58.8 
W1 430.3 1.7 430.3 1.7 430.2 1.7 441.6 4.3 448.2 5.9 454.4 7.4 
W2 202.4 -8.1 202.3 -8.2 202.3 -8.2 211.2 -4.1 216.4 -1.8 221.4 0.5 
W3 2054.6 -0.8 3078.3 -0.5 4613.2 -0.3 1025.9 -48.8 975.3 -33.2 783.9 -83.1 
Q1 654256 0.2 654247.4 0.2 654242.1 0.2 655954.3 0.4 656920.3 0.6 657826.5 0.7 
Q2 79013 -0.8 79011.3 -0.8 79010.3 -0.8 79351.5 -0.4 79545.1 -0.2 79727.3 0.1 
Q3 229317.8 -0.1 229381.4 -0.1 229422.7 0.0 267414.1 13.7 302178.6 29.2 380626.4 65.9 
P2 2160.2 2.9 2160.4 2.9 2160.5 2.9 2129.7 1.4 2112.4 0.6 2096.4 -0.2 
P3 1102.9 0.3 1101.8 0.2 1101.2 0.1 660.7 -34.8 439.6 -52.2 203.7 -81.5 
z 32.1  32.1  32.2  15.8  6.7  -2.0  
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Table 10. Effect of a 10% price support for coffee:  Assumption 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
Including Aerial Spray Eliminating Aerial Spray 
αj=0.2, β1=0.5, β2=0.5, β3=0.1, γ1=-0.3, γ2=-0.3, γ3=-0.1 αj=0.2, β1=0.5, β2=0.5, β3=0.1, γ1=-0.3, γ2=-0.3, γ3=-0.1, η=1 
ρ=0.2 
η=0.82 
∆% 
ρ=0.4 
η=0.68 
∆% 
ρ=0.7 
η=0.50 
∆% ρ=0.2 ∆% ρ=0.4 ∆% ρ=0.7 ∆% 
L1 778127.9 0.8 778113.2 0.8 778103.7 0.8 784643.2 1.7 789532.5 2.3 795331.8 3.1 
L2 145590.6 -4.2 145586.1 -4.2 145583.2 -4.2 147603.9 -2.8 149126.6 -1.8 150945.6 -0.6 
L3 48132.4 -0.1 48151.7 -0.1 48164.1 -0.1 39603.9 -17.8 33191.9 -31.1 25573.6 -46.9 
W1 430.2 1.7 430.2 1.7 430.2 1.7 437.5 3.4 442.9 4.7 449.5 6.2 
W2 202.3 -8.2 202.3 -8.2 202.3 -8.2 207.9 -5.6 212.2 -3.7 217.4 -1.3 
W3 2046.6 -1.2 3069.9 -0.8 4604.5 -0.5 291.1 -85.9 74.4 -64.5 8.2 -99.8 
Q1 654239.2 0.2 654236.7 0.2 654235.1 0.2 655331.1 0.3 656145.8 0.5 657106.9 0.6 
Q2 79009.7 -0.8 79009.2 -0.8 79008.9 -0.8 79227 -0.6 79389.8 -0.4 79582.5 -0.1 
Q3 229443.1 0.0 229461.2 0.0 229474.3 0.0 268254.1 16.9 314786.8 37.2 400484.1 74.5 
P2 2160.5 2.9 2160.6 2.9 2160.6 2.9 2140.8 1.9 2126.2 1.2 2109.1 0.4 
P3 1102.6 0.2 1101.7 0.2 1101.1 0.1 231 -79.0 46.7 -95.8 4.2 -99.6 
z 32.2  32.2  32.2  21.9  14.2  5.0  
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Table 11. Effect of a 10% price support for coffee:  Assumption 3 
 
 
Variables 
Including Aerial Spray Eliminating Aerial Spray 
αj=0.2, β1=0.5, β2=0.5, β3=0.1, γ1=-0.3, γ2=-0.3, γ3=-0.5 αj=0.2, β1=0.5, β2=0.5, β3=0.1, γ1=-0.3, γ2=-0.3, γ3=-0.5, η=1 
ρ=0.2 
η=0.82 
∆% 
ρ=0.4 
η=0.68 
∆% 
ρ=0.7 
η=0.50 
∆% ρ=0.2 ∆% ρ=0.4 ∆% ρ=0.7 ∆% 
L1 778133.9 0.8 778117.1 0.8 778106.2 0.8 780947.9 1.2 782711.5 1.4 784656.2 1.7 
L2 145592.5 -4.2 145587.3 -4.2 145583.9 -4.2 146459.7 -3.6 147005 -3.2 147607.9 -2.8 
L3 48124.6 -0.1 48146.5 -0.1 48160.9 -0.1 44443.5 -7.8 42134.5 -12.6 39586.9 -17.9 
W1 430.2 1.7 430.2 1.7 430.2 1.7 433.3 2.4 435.3 2.9 437.5 3.4 
W2 202.3 -8.2 202.3 -8.2 202.3 -8.2 204.7 -7.1 206.2 -6.4 207.9 -5.6 
W3 2043.3 -1.3 3066.7 -0.9 4601.4 -0.6 922 -55.5 808 -40.8 647.8 -86.0 
Q1 654240.2 0.2 654237.4 0.2 654235.5 0.2 654712.7 0.2 655008.1 0.3 655333.3 0.3 
Q2 79009.9 -0.8 79009.3 -0.8 79009 -0.8 79103.8 -0.7 79162.6 -0.7 79227.4 -0.6 
Q3 229435.7 0.0 229456.3 0.0 229471.2 0.0 274511.4 19.6 330169.9 43.9 437056.2 90.4 
P2 2160.5 2.9 2160.6 2.9 2160.6 2.9 2152 2.5 2146.6 2.2 2140.8 1.9 
P3 1100.6 0.1 1100.4 0.0 1100.2 0.0 768.8 -30.1 531.5 -51.7 303.3 -72.4 
z 32.2  32.2  32.2  27.7  25.0  21.9  
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The magnitudes of the ranges across the values of ρ are driven by the assumed 
elasticities as follows: Table 9 assumes the values of each triplet of elasticities are the 
same.  Table 10 assumes the same elasticities as in Table 9, except that the price 
elasticities of supply and demand for coca are more inelastic elasticities for coffee and 
cocoa.  Results in Table 11 assume the values as Table 10, except the price elasticity of 
demand for coca is less inelastic that the corresponding elasticities for coffee and cocoa.   
In all cases when eradication is eliminated while simultaneously providing a price 
support for coffee, coca output increases even though the area cultivated with coca 
declines indicating higher yields per hectare and farmers intensifying coca cultivation.  
The outcome of providing a 10% price support for coffee while simultaneously 
eliminating eradication is not substantially different from the outcome of eliminating 
eradication alone discussed in scenario one.  A 10% price support for coffee holds little 
promise to control coca supply from shifting upward if eradication is eliminated at the 
same time. 
Using the assumptions of Table 9 and no eradication, coca cultivation decreases 
by a larger amount and coca output increases by a smaller amount than when using the 
assumptions of Tables 10 and 11.  Also, the magnitude of the percentage change is larger 
for coca output and smaller for coca cultivation when assuming the elasticities of Table 
11 than when using the assumptions of Table 10. 
The effect of a price support for coffee is larger on cocoa than on coca.  A 10% 
price support for coffee decreases cocoa production by 8% relative to the benchmark 
equilibrium (with eradication) regardless of the values of ρ and assumed elasticities.  An 
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increase in the price of coffee with no eradication changes cocoa output from -0.7% to +1% 
depending on the hypothesized ρ values and the assumed elasticities.   
Initial farmers’ land allocation changes after a price support for coffee luring them 
to reallocate more land between coffee and cocoa than between coffee and coca. The 
Lagrangian multiplier indicates that the marginal profit generated by adding one hectare 
of land is about 32 dollars with eradication. The marginal profit of additional hectare of 
land decreases with no eradication due to gain in coca productivity and yields per hectare. 
• Scenario three: A 10% increase in the price of cocoa 
The partials effect of an exogenous 10% increase in the benchmark equilibrium 
price of cocoa with and without eradication of coca (lε=0) are summarized in Tables 12, 
13, and 14 using assumptions 1, 2, and 3 about the elasticities. 
Under a price support policy for cocoa, I again consider two alternatives: 1) with 
eradication and 2) no eradication.  Under eradication, the results indicate that coca output 
does not decrease and the area under coca cultivation decreases by less than 0.1% for all 
the hypothesized values of ρ.  Under no eradication, the results show that when ρ=0.2, 
the area cultivated with coca decreases from 7.5% to 27.8% and output increases from 
13.9% to 19.7%.  When ρ=0.4, the area cultivated with coca decreases from 12.3% to 
43.4% and output increases 31.9% to 43.9%.  When ρ=0.7, the area cultivated with coca 
decreases from 17.6% to 58.4% and output increases from 66.2% to 90.6%. 
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Table 12. Effect of a 10% price increase for cocoa: Assumption 1 
 
Variables 
Including Aerial Spray Eliminating Aerial Spray 
αj=0.2, βj=0.5, γj=-0.3 for j=1,2,3 αj=0.2, βj=0.5, γj=-0.3 for j=1,2,3, η=1 
ρ=0.2 
η=0.82 
∆% 
ρ=0.4 
η=0.68 
∆% 
ρ=0.7 
η=0.50 
ρ=0.2 
η=0.8 
ρ=0.2 ∆% ρ=0.4 ∆% ρ=0.7 ∆% 
L1 768139.4 -0.5 768129.6 -0.5 768124.1 -0.5 777323.3 0.7 782529.8 1.4 787538 2.0 
L2 155561.8 2.4 155557.3 2.4 155554.8 2.4 159713.2 5.1 162046.4 6.7 164276.7 8.1 
L3 48149 -0.1 48163.2 -0.1 48172 0.0 34813.7 -27.8 27273.8 -43.4 20036.3 -58.4 
W1 419.2 -0.9 419.2 -0.9 419.2 -0.9 429.3 1.4 435.1 2.8 440.7 4.1 
W2 230.9 4.8 230.9 4.8 230.9 4.8 243.4 10.5 250.6 13.8 257.5 16.9 
W3 2067.3 -0.2 3090.5 -0.1 4625.1 -0.1 1080.8 -47.8 991 -68.0 800.1 -82.7 
Q1 652550.9 -0.1 652549.2 -0.1 652548.3 -0.1 654103.8 0.1 654977.7 0.3 655814 0.4 
Q2 80063.4 0.5 80063 0.5 80062.7 0.5 80486.3 1.0 80720.1 1.3 80941 1.6 
Q3 229458.9 0.0 229472.1 0.0 229481.8 0.0 261426.1 13.9 302662.9 31.9 381408.5 66.2 
P1 2507.8 0.3 2507.8 0.3 2507.8 0.3 2488 -0.5 2476.9 -0.9 2466.4 -1.3 
P3 1100.6 0.1 1100.4 0.0 1100.2 0.0 712.6 -35.2 437.3 -60.2 202.3 -81.6 
z 6.8  6.9  6.9  -10.6  -20.5  -29.9  
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Table 13. Effect of a 10% price increase for cocoa: Assumption 2 
 
Variables 
Including Aerial Spray Eliminating Aerial Spray 
αj=0.2, β1=0.5, β2=0.5, β3=0.1, γ1=-0.3, γ2=-0.3, γ3=-0.1 αj=0.2, β1=0.5, β2=0.5, β3=0.1, γ1=-0.3, γ2=-0.3, γ3=-0.1, η=1 
ρ=0.2 
η=0.82 
∆% 
ρ=0.4 
η=0.68 
∆% 
ρ=0.7 
η=0.50 
ρ=0.2 
η=0.8 
ρ=0.2 ∆% ρ=0.4 ∆% ρ=0.7 ∆% 
L1 768120.7 -0.5 768117.9 -0.5 768116.2 -0.5 773838.4 0.3 777888.2 0.8 781416.8 1.3 
L2 155553.3 2.4 155552 2.4 155551.2 2.4 158143.2 4.1 159967.1 5.3 161548.9 6.3 
L3 48177 0.0 48181.1 0.0 48183.6 0.0 39869.3 -17.3 33995.7 -29.5 28885.3 -40.1 
W1 419.2 -0.9 419.2 -0.9 419.2 -0.9 425.5 0.5 430 1.6 433.9 2.5 
W2 230.9 4.8 230.9 4.8 230.9 4.8 238.7 8.4 244.2 10.8 249.1 13.1 
W3 2065.6 -0.3 3088.7 -0.2 4623.2 -0.1 311.2 -85.0 94.5 -96.9 27.7 -99.4 
Q1 652547.7 -0.1 652547.2 -0.1 652546.9 -0.1 653516.3 0.1 654198.9 0.2 654791.3 0.2 
Q2 80062.6 0.5 80062.4 0.5 80062.3 0.5 80327.4 0.8 80511.8 1.0 80670.4 1.2 
Q3 229485.6 0.0 229489.2 0.0 229492.8 0.0 268612.7 17.0 316296.8 37.8 410357.5 78.8 
P1 2507.8 0.3 2507.8 0.3 2507.8 0.3 2495.5 -0.2 2486.8 -0.5 2479.3 -0.8 
P3 1100.5 0.0 1100.4 0.0 1100.2 0.0 228 -79.3 44.5 -96.0 3.3 -99.7 
z 6.9  6.9  6.9  -4.0  -11.7  -18.4  
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Table 14. Effect of a 10% price increase for cocoa: Assumption 3 
 
Variables 
Including Aerial Spray Eliminating Aerial Spray 
αj=0.2, β1=0.5, β2=0.5, β3=0.1, γ1=-0.3, γ2=-0.3, γ3=-0.5 αj=0.2, β1=0.5, β2=0.5, β3=0.1, γ1=-0.3, γ2=-0.3, γ3=-0.5, η=1 
ρ=0.2 
η=0.82 
∆% 
ρ=0.4 
η=0.68 
∆% 
ρ=0.7 
η=0.50 
ρ=0.2 
η=0.8 
ρ=0.2 ∆% ρ=0.4 ∆% ρ=0.7 ∆% 
L1 768121.9 -0.5 768118.7 -0.5 768116.6 -0.5 770613.9 -0.1 772196.6 0.1 773936.7 0.3 
L2 155553.8 2.4 155552.4 2.4 155551.4 2.4 156684.8 3.1 157401.3 3.6 158187.6 4.1 
L3 48175.3 0.0 48180 0.0 48183 0.0 44552.3 -7.5 42253.1 -12.3 39726.7 -17.6 
W1 419.2 -0.9 419.2 -0.9 419.2 -0.9 422 -0.3 423.7 0.1 425.6 0.6 
W2 230.9 4.8 230.9 4.8 230.9 4.8 234.3 6.4 236.4 7.3 238.8 8.4 
W3 2064.9 -0.3 3088 -0.2 4622.6 -0.1 944.8 -54.4 831 -73.1 671.1 -85.5 
Q1 652547.9 -0.1 652547.3 -0.1 652547 -0.1 652970.7 0.0 653238.7 0.0 653532.9 0.1 
Q2 80062.6 0.5 80062.5 0.5 80062.4 0.5 80178.7 0.6 80251.9 0.7 80331.9 0.8 
Q3 229484 0.0 229488.1 0.0 229492.3 0.0 274645.7 19.7 330355.6 43.9 437364.4 90.6 
P1 2507.8 0.3 2507.8 0.3 2507.8 0.3 2502.4 0.1 2499 0.0 2495.2 -0.2 
P3 1100.1 0.0 1100.1 0.0 1100 0.0 768.1 -30.2 530.9 -51.7 302.9 -72.5 
z 6.9  6.9  6.9  2.1  -0.9  -4.2  
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The magnitudes of the ranges across the values of ρ are driven by the assumed 
elasticities in Tables 12, 13, and 14.  Again, Table 12 assumes the values of each triplet 
of elasticities are the same.  Table 13 assumes the same elasticities as in Table 12, except 
that the price elasticities of supply and demand for coca are more inelastic elasticities for 
coffee and cocoa and Table 14 assume the values as Table 13, except the price elasticity 
of demand for coca is less inelastic that the corresponding elasticities for coffee and 
cocoa.   
In all cases when eradication is eliminated while simultaneously providing a price 
support for cocoa, output increases even though the area cultivated with coca declines 
indicating higher yields per hectare and farmers intensifying coca cultivation per the area.  
These results are similar to the results when price support was provided for coffee.  A 10% 
price support for cocoa with no eradication is not substantially different from the effect of 
eliminating eradication alone as discussed in scenario one.  A 10% price support for coca 
holds little promise to control coca supply from shifting upward if eradication is 
eliminated simultaneously. 
Using the assumptions of Table 12 with no eradication, coca cultivation decreases 
by a larger amount and coca output increases by a smaller amount than when using the 
assumptions of Tablets 13 and 14.  Also, the magnitude of the percentage change is larger 
on coca output and smaller on coca cultivation when assuming the elasticities of Table 14 
than when using the assumptions of Table 13.  There is virtually no difference in coca 
output and area cultivated with coca under eradication. 
The effect of a price support for cocoa is larger on coffee than on coca.  This 
result is similar to scenario two where land reallocation between alternative crops is 
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larger than land reallocation between licit and illicit crops.  A 10% price support for 
cocoa decreases coffee production by 1% relative to equilibrium with eradication 
regardless of the values of ρ and assumed elasticities.  A price increase on cocoa with 
eradication increases coffee output up to 0.4% depending on the hypothesized ρ values 
and the assumed elasticities.   
Initial farmers’ land allocation changes after a price support for cocoa luring them 
to reallocate more land between coffee and cocoa rather than between cocoa and coca. 
The Lagrangian multiplier indicates that the marginal profit generated by adding one 
hectare of land is about 7 dollars with eradication.  The marginal profit of additional 
hectare of land decreases with no eradication due to gain in coca productivity and yields 
per hectare. 
• Scenario four: A 10% increase in the price of coffee and cocoa 
The effects of a 10% price support for coffee and cocoa, with and without 
eradication are shown in Tables 15, 16, and 17 using the elasticities assumptions 1, 2, and 
3. 
In the price support policy for both crops coffee and cocoa I also considered two 
alternatives: 1) with eradication and 2) no eradication.  With eradication, the results show 
that coca output and area under coca cultivation decreases by less than 1% regardless of 
the values of ρ.  With no eradication, the results show that when ρ=0.2 the area cultivated 
with coca decreases from 7.8% to 28.4% and output increases from 13.7% to 19.6%.  
When ρ=0.4, the area cultivated with coca decreases from 12.6% to 43.9% and output 
increases 31.6% to 43.9%.  
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Table 15. Effect of a 10% price support for coffee and cocoa: Assumption 1 
 
Variables 
Including Aerial Spray Eliminating Aerial Spray 
αj=0.2, βj=0.5, γj=-0.3 for j=1,2,3 αj=0.2, βj=0.5, γj=-0.3 for j=1,2,3, η=1 
ρ=0.2 
η=0.82 
∆% 
ρ=0.4 
η=0.68 
∆% 
ρ=0.7 
η=0.50 
ρ=0.2 
η=0.8 
ρ=0.2 ∆% ρ=0.4 ∆% ρ=0.7 ∆% 
L1 775415.2 0.5 775360 0.5 775326 0.5 785170.6 1.7 790615 2.4 795855.5 3.1 
L2 148459.9 -2.3 148438.9 -2.3 148426 -2.3 152160.8 0.2 154224.1 1.5 156208.3 2.8 
L3 47975.2 -0.4 48051.2 -0.3 48099 -0.2 34518.7 -28.4 27010.9 -43.9 19787.2 -58.9 
W1 427.2 0.9 427.2 0.9 427.1 0.9 438 3.5 444.1 4.9 450 6.3 
W2 210.3 -4.5 210.3 -4.5 210.2 -4.6 221 0.3 227 3.0 232.9 5.7 
W3 2052.4 -0.9 3076.1 -0.6 4611.1 -0.4 1062.5 -48.7 972 -68.6 780.4 -83.1 
Q1 653782.4 0.1 653773.1 0.1 653767.3 0.1 655419.2 0.3 656325.6 0.5 657193.4 0.6 
Q2 79318.7 -0.5 79316.4 -0.5 79315 -0.5 79710.3 0.0 79925.3 0.3 80129.9 0.6 
Q3 229293 -0.1 229365.4 -0.1 229412.2 0.0 260981.5 13.7 302077.2 31.6 380455.3 65.8 
P3 1103.3 0.3 1102.1 0.2 1101.4 0.1 716.6 -34.9 440.1 -60.0 204 -81.5 
z 36.5  36.6  36.6  21.7  12.4  4.1  
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Table 16. Effect of a 10% price support for coffee and cocoa: Assumption 2 
 
Variables 
Including Aerial Spray Eliminating Aerial Spray 
αj=0.2, β1=0.5, β2=0.5, β3=0.1, γ1=-0.3, γ2=-0.3, γ3=-0.1 αj=0.2, β1=0.5, β2=0.5, β3=0.1, γ1=-0.3, γ2=-0.3, γ3=-0.1, η=1 
ρ=0.2 
η=0.82 
∆% 
ρ=0.4 
η=0.68 
∆% 
ρ=0.7 
η=0.50 
ρ=0.2 
η=0.8 
ρ=0.2 ∆% ρ=0.4 ∆% ρ=0.7 ∆% 
L1 775307.5 0.5 775291.6 0.5 775281.3 0.5 781521.9 1.3 786261.1 1.9 792444.8 2.7 
L2 148419 -2.3 148412.9 -2.3 148409 -2.3 150777.1 -0.8 152574.2 0.4 154917.2 2.0 
L3 48124.6 -0.1 48146.5 -0.1 48160.7 -0.1 39552 -17.9 33015.7 -31.5 24489.1 -49.2 
W1 427.1 0.9 427.1 0.9 427.1 0.9 434 2.6 439.3 3.8 446.2 5.4 
W2 210.2 -4.6 210.2 -4.6 210.2 -4.6 217 -1.5 222.2 0.9 229 3.9 
W3 2043.2 -1.3 3066.6 -0.9 4601.2 -0.6 287.3 -86.1 70.5 -97.7 5.3 -99.9 
Q1 653764.2 0.1 653761.5 0.1 653759.8 0.1 654808.9 0.3 655601.2 0.4 656629.1 0.5 
Q2 79314.3 -0.5 79313.7 -0.5 79313.2 -0.5 79564.7 -0.2 79753.5 0.1 79997 0.4 
Q3 229435.6 0.0 229456.2 0.0 229471 0.0 268183.8 16.9 314451.8 37.0 397028.3 73.0 
P3 1102.9 0.3 1102 0.2 1101.2 0.1 231.7 -78.9 47.2 -95.7 4.6 -99.6 
z 36.7  36.7  36.7  26.8  19.3  9.5  
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Table 17. Effect of a 10% price support for coffee and cocoa: Assumption 3 
 
Variables 
Including Aerial Spray Eliminating Aerial Spray 
αj=0.2, β1=0.5, β2=0.5, β3=0.1, γ1=-0.3, γ2=-0.3, γ3=-0.5 αj=0.2, β1=0.5, β2=0.5, β3=0.1, γ1=-0.3, γ2=-0.3, γ3=-0.5, η=1 
ρ=0.2 
η=0.82 
∆% 
ρ=0.4 
η=0.68 
∆% 
ρ=0.7 
η=0.50 
ρ=0.2 
η=0.8 
ρ=0.2 ∆% ρ=0.4 ∆% ρ=0.7 ∆% 
L1 775313.9 0.5 775295.8 0.5 775284 0.5 777990.4 0.8 779666 1.0 781516.3 1.3 
L2 148421.4 -2.3 148414.5 -2.3 148410 -2.3 149437.2 -1.6 150073 -1.2 150774.9 -0.8 
L3 48115.7 -0.2 48140.6 -0.1 48157 -0.1 44423.3 -7.8 42112 -12.6 39559.8 -17.9 
W1 427.1 0.9 427.1 0.9 427.1 0.9 430.1 1.6 431.9 2.1 434 2.6 
W2 210.2 -4.6 210.2 -4.6 210.2 -4.6 213.1 -3.3 214.9 -2.5 216.9 -1.5 
W3 2039.5 -1.5 3062.9 -1.0 4597.7 -0.7 917.8 -55.7 803.7 -74.0 643.4 -86.1 
Q1 653765.3 0.1 653762.3 0.1 653760.3 0.1 654216.1 0.2 654497.6 0.2 654808 0.3 
Q2 79314.6 -0.5 79313.8 -0.5 79313.3 -0.5 79422.8 -0.3 79490.3 -0.2 79564.5 -0.2 
Q3 229427.1 0.0 229450.7 0.0 229467.5 0.0 274486.5 19.6 330134.8 43.9 436996.3 90.4 
P3 1100.7 0.1 1100.4 0.0 1100.3 0.0 769 -30.1 531.6 -51.7 303.4 -72.4 
z 36.7  36.7  36.7  32.4  29.8  26.8  
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When ρ=0.7, the area cultivated with coca decreases from 17.9% to 58.9% and 
output increases from 65.8% to 90.4%.  The magnitudes of the ranges across the values 
of ρ are driven by the assumed elasticities as follow: Table 15 assumes the values of each 
triplet of elasticities are the same.  Table 16 assumes the same elasticities as in Table 15, 
except that the price elasticities of supply and demand for coca are more inelastic 
elasticities for coffee and cocoa.  Results in Table 17 assume the values as Table 16, 
except the price elasticity of demand for coca is less inelastic that the corresponding 
elasticities for coffee and cocoa.   
In all cases when eradication is eliminated while simultaneously providing a price 
support for coffee and cocoa, output increases even though the area cultivated with coca 
declines indicating higher yields per hectare and farmers intensifying coca cultivation per 
the area.  The result of providing a 10% price support for coffee and cocoa while 
simultaneously eliminating eradication is not substantially different than the effect of 
eliminating eradication alone discussed in scenario one.  There is a small gain in 
decreasing coca cultivation and output by providing a price support for coffee and cocoa 
simultaneously than the scenarios two and three.  However, the magnate of this change is 
very small.  A 10% price support for coffee and cocoa together still holds little promise to 
control coca supply from shifting upward if eradication is eliminated simultaneously. 
Using the assumptions of Table 15 with no eradication, coca cultivation decreases 
by a larger amount and coca output increases by a smaller amount than when using the 
assumptions of Tablets 16 and 17.  Also, the magnitude of the percentage change is larger 
on coca output and smaller on coca cultivation when assuming the elasticities of Table 17 
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than when using the assumptions of Table 16.  There is no significant difference in coca 
output and area cultivated with coca under eradication. 
Under eradication, providing a simultaneous 10% price support for coffee and 
cocoa increases coffee output by 1% and decreases cocoa production by 0.5% relative to 
equilibrium regardless of the values of ρ and assumed elasticities.  The policy effect on 
output and cultivation between alternative crops is smaller when both crops are provided 
a price support rather than individual crops.  The Lagrangian multiplier indicates that the 
marginal profit generated by adding one hectare of land is about 37 dollars with 
eradication.  The marginal profit of additional hectare of land decreases with no 
eradication due to gain in coca productivity and yields per hectare. 
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CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In summary, an alternative crops policy alone holds little promise to significantly 
reduce coca production.  Although coffee is shown to be more competitive than cocoa for 
reducing coca production, price support on individual crops has little effect on coca 
cultivation and coca production.  There is a small gain in reducing coca cultivation by 
providing a simultaneous price support to several alternatives crops.  If peasant farmers 
seek to maximize profits, they would be lured to substitute land between alternative crops 
rather than taking land away from coca production.  This substitution occurs because the 
relative profit derived from coca is larger than the relative profit from alternative crops.   
 Eradication policy has a negative effect on agricultural productivity. Eliminating 
eradication of coca increases production of both coca and traditional crops.  Although 
eliminating aerial spray could decrease total land cultivated with coca, these gains can be 
offset by the increase of coca output because of increasing coca yields per hectare.  
However, the decrease of land cultivated with coca leads to an increase of alternative 
crops cultivation. 
Because the volume of coca output rather than area cultivated with coca is what 
causes the harm, eliminating aerial spray has a negative effect in controlling coca supply 
in Colombia.  From a policy standpoint, results suggest that alternative crops alone have 
low potential to prevent increase of coca supply if aerial spray is suspended in Colombia.  
Although alternative crops policies alone would be ineffective in controlling a shift in 
coca supply due to the absence of aerial spray, they will prevent the negative effect 
associated with externalities of this policy. 
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 There are several limitations of this study.  One limitation is associated with the 
assumptions about the elasticities and ρ values.  This study hypothesizes a functional 
form to explain the effect of eradication on coca production.  Assuming values for the 
coefficients rather than estimating and testing them generates a substantial variation in 
the results.  Another limitation is that this analysis does not include manual eradication of 
coca plantations.  Manual eradication is likely to play a key role in the control of cocoa 
cultivation if aerial spray is to be suspended in Colombia.  Another limitation is that the 
coca industry is interconnected across the South American Andes; therefore, these results 
are not independent from policy measures in the other major producers like Peru and 
Bolivia.  It is necessary to integrate cross-country effects of coca production to fully 
evaluate the effect of a policy change in the long run. 
Combining education, moral suasion, and manual eradication policy with 
economic incentives to cultivate alternative crops could provide better outcomes in 
controlling coca supply in Colombia.  Additionally, implementing alternative crops with 
higher returns could produce better results in controlling cocoa supply. 
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